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Redefining "American": The
Constitutionality of State Dream Acts
Sallie Dietricht
Introduction
"I'm an American; I just don't have the right papers."' These
are the words of Jose Antonio Vargas, formerly a journalist for the
Washington Post, who recently wrote an article describing his
experience living in the United States as an undocumented
immigrant. The message of the piece is simple: Vargas, who
came to the United States illegally as a child, is no less American
than any other person who grew up in the United States.' Vargas
believed that hard work and contribution to American society
would eventually provide him with a path to citizenship.' In
describing his initial struggles to find employment, Vargas recalls
finding hope in the introduction of the 2003 version of the federal

t. J.D. Candidate 2013, University of Minnesota Law School. The author
would like to thank Professor Stephen Meili for his invaluable assistance in writing
this Note, as well as the wonderful staff and editors of the Law & Inequality.
1. Jose Antonio Vargas, Define American: Jose's Story, YOUTUBE (June 20,
2011), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TJH1IKqF8PA. The quoted language is
part of Vargas's definition of "American":
I define American as someone who works hard-someone who's proud to
be in this country, and wants to contribute to it. I'm independent; I pay
taxes; I'm self-sufficient. I'm an American; I just don't have the right
papers. I take full responsibility for my actions, and I'm sorry for the laws
that I broke.
Id.
2. See Jose Antonio Vargas, My Life as an Undocumented Immigrant, N.Y.
TIMES MAG., June 22, 2011, availableat http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/26/
magazine/my-life-as-an-undocumented-immigrant.html?_r=2&pagewanted=all.
3. Id. In this Note, the term "American" refers to a person who grew up in the
United States, regardless of immigration status. For a discussion of the
psychological attachment to the United States that undocumented children often
develop, see Ragini Shah, Sharing the American Dream: Towards Formalizing the
Status of Long-Term Resident Undocumented Children in the United States, 39
COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 637, 665-70 (2008).

4. Vargas, supra note 2. As of July 2012, there has been no change in Vargas's
immigration status, although his driver's license has been cancelled. John Hudson,
What's Happened to Jose Antonio Vargas Since His Admission, ATLANTIC WIRE,
July 22, 2011, http://www.theatlantiwire.com/polities/2011/07/whats-happenedjose-antonio-vargas-his-admission/40272/.
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DREAM Act.' Indeed, the federal DREAM Act, which would
provide both education benefits and provide a path to citizenship
for qualifying undocumented immigrants,6 is exactly the type of
opportunity for which Vargas had hoped.
Unfortunately, for Vargas and over two million more
undocumented immigrants8 who grew up as Americans, the
federal DREAM Act is not expected to pass in the near future.'
There is, however, some hope for Vargas and other undocumented
immigrants who wish to remain in the United States. Several
states have passed legislation allowing students to attend state
universities, and even receive in-state tuition, without
documentation of their immigration status." Often referred to as
5. See Vargas, supra note 2 ("I was hopeful.... [The DREAM Act] seemed like
the legislative version of what I'd told myself: If I work hard and contribute, things
will work out."); see also Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors Act
at
Cong.
(2003),
available
2003,
S.
1545,
108th
of
The
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-108sl545rs/pdflBILLS-108sl545rs.pdf
most recent version, S. 952, 112th Cong. (2011), can be found at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-112s952is/pdflBILLS-112s952is.pdf
[hereinafter DREAM Act].
6. In this Note, the term "undocumented immigrant" refers to a foreign-born
person living within the United States without authorization. Although coming to,
and living in, the United States without authorization are illegal acts under 8
U.S.C. § 1304 (2006), this Note does not use the term "illegal" to refer to people
because of the pejorative connotations often associated with such terminology. See,
e.g., Jose Antonio Vargas, Not Legal, Not Leaving, TIME, June 25, 2012, available at

http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,2117243,00.html ("'Why haven't
you gotten deported?' That's usually the first thing people ask me when they learn
I'm an undocumented immigrant or, put more rudely, an 'illegal.'").
7. See S. 952. The pathway to citizenship (which state legislation cannot
provide) would require that an immigrant either complete at least two years of
higher education, or two years of military service. Id. at § 5(a)(1)(D). Those who
have committed crimes while in the United States would, in general, not be eligible
for citizenship. Id. at § 3(b)(1)(D).
8. RAUL HINOJOSA OJEDA ET AL., No DREAMERS LEFT BEHIND: THE
ECONOMIC POTENTIAL OF DREAM ACT BENEFICIARIES 2 (2010) (estimating that

policy analysis suggests that approximately 2.1 million individuals could qualify for
legalization under the DREAM Act).
9. See Joyce Adams, The DREAM Lives On: Why the DREAM Act Died and
Next Steps for Immigration Reform, 25 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 545, 545-47 (2011)
(discussing the future of the Federal Act). The last congressional vote on the
DREAM Act, on December 18, 2010, resulted in a handful of Democratic senators
breaking party lines and voting against the bill. Id. at 545-46. Some Republican
senators who had previously supported the Act (including Orrin Hatch, who
initially introduced the DREAM Act in 2001 and had been a strong advocate for the
bill) also voted against it. Id. at 546. For a more detailed analysis of the federal
Act, see Elisha Barron, Recent Development: The Development, Relief and
Education for Alien Minors (DREAM)Act, 48 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 623 passim (2011).
10. See NAT'L IMMIGR. LAW CTR., BASIC FACTS ABOUT IN-STATE TUITION FOR
UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANT STUDENTS 1 (2011). The states which to date have
passed such legislation are California, Connecticut, Illinois, Kansas, Maryland,
Nebraska, New Mexico, New York, Oklahoma, Texas, Utah, and Washington. Id.
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state Dream Acts, this type of legislation generally provides
undocumented immigrants access to educational assistance. 12
Generally, under state Dream Acts, those who would be eligible for
permanent residency under the federal DREAM Act would be
eligible for in-state tuition at public universities." Given that the
increasing cost of higher education is making financing college a
major concern, in-state tuition eligibility is a significant benefit for
undocumented immigrants who wish to attend college. 4
For those waiting to adjust their immigration status, the
First and
importance of education cannot be overstated."
foremost, enrollment in college can delay deportation. Policy
guidelines distributed in June of 2011 by the director of
Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE) list "pursuit of
education in the United States" as one factor that should weigh in
favor of exercising prosecutorial discretion.
Similarly, a June
11. In this Note, the federal Act is referred to as the "DREAM Act," and state
acts are referred to as "Dream Acts."
12. See Barron, supra note 9, at 652. Even if the DREAM Act is passed, it will
not require states to provide in-state tuition to undocumented residents. See S.
It will, however, allow states more flexibility in
952, 112th Cong. (2011).
structuring such legislation. Id. § 9(b) (giving states the option to provide
postsecondary education benefits, such as in-state tuition, to undocumented
immigrants).
13. See, e.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE § 68130.5 (Deering 2011) (providing that those
without lawful immigration status may be granted in-state tuition upon, inter alia,
filing an affidavit stating their intent to petition for lawful status as soon as they
are eligible).
14. See GEORGES VERNEZ & LEE MIZELL, GOAL: To DOUBLE THE RATE OF
HISPANICS EARNING A BACHELOR'S DEGREE 37 (2001) ("[Seventy-five] percent of

Hispanic college freshmen have financial concerns, compared with [fifty-eight]
percent of their non-Hispanic [Wihite counterparts. By their senior year, one-fourth
of Hispanics report they are working full-time to support themselves in college
compared with [ten] percent for non-Hispanic [Whites."). Although this Note does
not focus upon race, an overwhelming majority (approximately eighty-four percent)
of potential DREAM Act beneficiaries are from Mexico and Latin America. See
JEANNE BATALOVA & MARGIE MCHUGH, DREAM vs. REALITY: AN ANALYSIS OF
POTENTIAL DREAM ACT BENEFICIARIES 6 (2010).

15. See VERNEZ & MIZELL, supra note 14, at 13 ("Education is the single most
important factor in providing the skills and knowledge needed by the nation's
economy and in determining the level of individual income. Higher levels of
education are also associated with better health, better job satisfaction, and
participation in civic and commercial activities.").
16. U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND
SEC., MEMORANDUM ON EXERCISING PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION CONSISTENT WITH
THE CIVIL IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT PRIORITIES OF THE AGENCY FOR THE
APPREHENSION, DETENTION, AND REMOVAL OF ALIENS 4 (2011). Other factors to be

considered include "the circumstances of the person's arrival in the United States
and the manner of his or her entry, particularly if the alien came to the United
States as a young child," and "the person's ties and contributions to the
community." Id. Factors that can weigh towards deportation under the policy
include criminal history, prior removal from the United States, and a lack of
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2012 memorandum from the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) encourages the use of prosecutorial discretion in cases
where an undocumented immigrant is currently in school." These
small measures of leniency by ICE and by DHS are of vital
importance to undocumented immigrants waiting to adjust their
status, as the current grounds for petitions to adjust immigration
status are extremely narrow. Additionally, a student's application

for a green card can result in the deportation of his entire family.18
State Dream Acts will not only help undocumented immigrants
access education, they will also protect students' families while the
student petitions to adjust his or her status.'9
Helping to prevent deportation is only one of several benefits
that state Acts would confer on undocumented immigrants. By
providing access to education, state Dream Acts allow people a
chance to prepare themselves for higher wage jobs as soon as they
attain legal status."' Though state legislation cannot offer
undocumented immigrants permanent resident status as the
federal Act would, state Dream Acts are undeniably an important
step for those waiting for the DREAM Act to pass.

However, any state action that encroaches on federal
immigration policy raises concerns of federal preemption." The
political branches of the federal government have plenary power
cooperation with immigration officials. Id. These guidelines have been subject to
some controversy, as they parallel many of the terms the DREAM Act would
provide. See, e.g., R. Cort Kirkwood, Circumventing Congress: Failed Dream Act
Mandated
by
ICE
Director, NEW
AMERICAN,
June
27,
2011,

http://thenewamerican.com/usnews/immigration/8015-circumventing-congressfailed-dream-act-mandated-by-ice-director.
17. JANET NAPOLITANO, U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., MEMORANDUM ON
EXERCISING PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION WITH RESPECT TO INDIVIDUALS WHO
CAME TO THE UNITED STATES AS CHILDREN 1 (2012), available at

http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/sl-exercising-prosecutorial-discretionindividuals-who-came-to-us-as-children.pdf.
18. See VERNEZ & MIZELL, supranote 14, at 2.
19. See also Adams, supra note 9, at 546-49 (discussing the Obama
administration's deportation policy and its effect on those eligible for the DREAM
Act).
20. See, e.g., Roberto G. Gonzales, State Dream Acts Offer Important
Opportunities to Undocumented Students, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 8, 2011, 10:40

AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/roberto-g-gonzales/state-dream-acts-offerim b_951342.html ("The California and Illinois Dream Acts provide an important
boost to undocumented immigrant youngsters in their states who might otherwise
find themselves making early entries into the low wage labor market.") (emphasis

added).
21. See De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 354 (1976) ("Power to regulate
immigration is unquestionably exclusively a federal power."), superseded by statute,
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359, as
recognized in Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968 (2011).
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over immigration, thus any type of state action regarding
immigration likely encroaches upon this power.2 2 For example,
preemption concerns prompted the Supreme Court to strike down
much of an Arizona bill (S.B. 1070)' designed to heighten
immigration enforcement by Arizona police.24 S.B. 1070 was
initially struck down by the Ninth Circuit, citing preemption
concerns, and the majority of the ruling was affirmed by the
Supreme Court in June 2012." Similarly, a city housing ordinance
in Escondido, California that penalized landlords renting to
undocumented immigrants was also enjoined due to "serious
concerns regarding the constitutionality of the Ordinance and its
preemption by federal law."26 Ordinances in Farmers Branch,
Texas and Hazleton, Pennsylvania have also been subject to
That this type of restrictionist28 state
scrutiny in the courts
legislation is preempted by federal law suggests that state
legislation providing education benefits to undocumented
immigrants may also be preempted. 29 However, state Dream Acts
may avoid invalidation on preemption grounds if drafted carefully
so as to be consonant with relevant federal statutes.30
22. See JON FEERE, PLENARY POWER: SHOULD JUDGES CONTROL U.S.
IMMIGRATION
POLICY?
1
(2009),
available
at
http://www.cis.orgarticles/2009/back209.pdf; Ralph W. Kasarda, Affirmative Action
Gone Haywire: Why State Laws Granting College Tuition Preferences to Illegal
Aliens Are Preempted by Federal Law, 2009 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 197,226-33 (2009).

23. Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act, S.B. 1070,
49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2010) [S.B. 1070].
24. Id.

25. See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012).
26. See Garrett v. City of Escondido, 465 F. Supp. 2d 1043, 1056-57 (S.D. Cal.
2006).
27. See Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 620 F.3d 170 (2010). Although the Hazleton
ordinance was found by the Third Circuit to be unconstitutional for "disrupting a
well-established federal scheme for regulating the presence and employment of
immigrants in the United States," the holding was vacated by the Supreme Court
and remanded to the Court of Appeals. City of Hazleton v. Lozano, 131 S. Ct. 2958
(2011); cf United States v. Alabama, 691 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 2012) (engaging in a
section-by-section preemption analysis of an Alabama law akin to Arizona's S.B.
1070).
28. This Note uses the term "restrictionist" to describe a general category of
legislation promulgating restrictions against undocumented immigrants.
29. See Kasarda, supra note 22, at 226-30 (arguing that state Dream Acts are
preempted by federal statutes). Contra Martinez v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 50
Cal. 4th 1277 (2010) (holding that a California statute permitting certain
undocumented immigrants to receive in-state tuition was not preempted by federal
law).
30. See, e.g., Martinez, 50 Cal. 4th 1277.

The court's summary of the "main

legal issue" in Martinez is illustrative of how careful drafting may avoid
preemption problems:
The main legal issue is this: Section 1623 provides that an alien not

170

Law and Inequality

[Vol. 31:165

This Note compares two categories of state regulation of
legislation which is intended to heighten
immigration:
enforcement of immigration policy, and legislation which is
intended to provide financial assistance for college to
undocumented immigrants. By contrasting these two kinds of
state action, this Note explains why the preemption concerns
which have been detrimental to S.B. 1070, and similar
restrictionist state actions, are not applicable to state Dream Acts.
Part I of this Note describes the current debate over state Dream
Acts. Part II focuses on the federal power to regulate immigration,
specifically on the doctrines of plenary power and federalism."
Part III discusses anti-immigration legislation and local
ordinances in the United States which have been struck down by
courts as preempted by federal law. Part IV argues that the state
Dream Acts are constitutional, notwithstanding preemption
concerns. Part V of this Note makes recommendations to states
which are considering immigration relief legislation, and describes
how states which have passed Dream Acts can improve the
legislation to prevent challenges in court.
The Current Debate: Providing In-State Tuition to
Undocumented Immigrants
The debate over state Dream Acts is sharply divided and
often heated. Proponents of Dream Acts often present this type of
legislation as correcting a moral wrong.32 Opponents argue Dream
I.

lawfully present in this country shall not be eligible on the basis of
residence within a state for any postsecondary education benefit unless a
citizen or national of this country is eligible for that benefit. In general,
nonresidents of California . . . must pay nonresident tuition. But section

68130.5, subdivision (a), exempts from this requirement studentsincluding those not lawfully in this country-who meet certain
requirements, primarily that they have attended high school in California
for at least three years. The question is whether this exemption is based on
residence within California in violation of section 1623.
Because the exemption is given to all who have attended high school in
California for at least three years (and meet the other requirements) ..... we
conclude the exemption is not based on residence in California. . . . Accordingly,
section 68130.5 does not violate section 1623.
31. See Monica Guizar, Facts About Federal Preemption: How to Analyze
Whether State and Local Initiatives are an Unlawful Attempt to Enforce Federal
Immigration Law of Regulate Immigration, IMMIGR. DAILY (last visited Oct. 19,

2012, 10:00 PM), http://www.ilw.com/articles/2008,0129-guizar.shtm.
32. See, e.g., Sam Stein, Huckabee Opposes Changing 14th Amendment, Setting
Himself Apart From GOP Again, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 12, 2010, 10:41 AM),

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/08/12/huckabee-opposeschanging-n_679781.html. Former Arkansas Governor Mike Huckabee framed the
argument both in terms of moral right and economic policy in this interview:
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Acts will be too costly." Fears that giving undocumented students
in-state tuition will be a burden on states, or that the Acts would
result in immigrants taking jobs from citizens, are frequently
mentioned.' These fears, which are often couched in racism and
cultural misunderstanding, simply do not withstand economic
analysis.' Even if fewer than half those eligible for educational
aid under the federal DREAM Act applied for benefits, the overall
economic benefit to the United States would be over $1.4 trillion
over forty years." Allowing talented, capable people to join the
workforce and contribute to state and local economies is
undeniably a profitable enterprise."'
Beyond the economic benefits of state Dream Acts, however,
the truth is that the Acts are a manifestation of the American
Dream." The students the Acts would affect have, like Vargas,
lived in the United States since they were children." Students
When a kid comes to his [sic] country, and he's four years old and he had
no choice in it . . . it's the state's responsibility-in fact, it is the state's
legal mandate-to make sure that child is in school. So let's say that kid
goes to school. That kid is in our school from kindergarten through the
12th grade. He graduates as valedictorian because he's a smart kid and he
works his rear end off and he becomes the valedictorian of the school. The
question is: Is he better off going to college and becoming a neurosurgeon
or a banker or whatever he might become, and becoming a taxpayer, and
in the process having to apply for and achieve citizenship, or should we
make him pick tomatoes? I think it's better if he goes to college and
becomes a citizen.
Id.
33. See Luis Miranda, Get the Facts of the DREAM Act, WHITE HOUSE BLOG
(Dec. 1, 2010, 7:19 PM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2010/12/01/get-factsdream-act.
34. See, e.g., Barron, supra note 9, at 653-54 (noting that California Governor
Arnold Schwarzenegger vetoed a California law that would have allowed
undocumented to students to apply for state aid because of the state's fragile fiscal
condition); Adams, supra note 9, at 549 ("Those who opposed the [DREAM Act] are
heartened that the new Congress will place a greater emphasis on preventing noncitizens from 'taking' jobs that could be filled by Americans and on immigration
enforcement.").
35. OJEDA ET AL., supra note 8, at 3 ("[T]he DREAM Act represents an
opportunity for American taxpayers to significantly increase the return on our
current, and already spent, investment in youths that the public school system
educates in their K-12 years."). Estimates of potential benefits are high; one
government estimate, for example, predicts the DREAM Act would increase
government revenue by $2.3 billion over the next ten years. Miranda, supra note
33.
36. Miranda, supra note 33.
37. See id. (noting that DREAM Act-eligible students have been referred to as
"the cream of the crop" by top military officials).
38. See Vargas, supra note 2.
39. NAT'L IMMIGR. LAW CTR., supra note 10, at 1. The federal DREAM Act
would only provide benefits to persons who are younger than age thirty-five at the
time of its passage. DREAM Act, S. 952, 112th Cong (2011). State Acts generally
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who wish to attend college often face a difficult choice upon
graduating high school: they can either attempt to obtain a green
card and risk their family's deportation or attempt to pay out-ofstate tuition rates." Faced with these choices, such as they are,
students who would otherwise be qualified to attend college find
their high school achievements are worth nothing." Without any
knowledge of their home country, these students find their best
option is to remain in the United States illegally, working in lowwage jobs.42 Simply put, a hardworking student who has not
known any country except the United States deserves better.
State DreamActs Are Supported by the Equal Protection
Clause
The passage of state Dream Acts is not only a moral
imperative, but is also a way to ensure equal protection under the
United States Constitution.' Under Plyler v. Doe," minor children
of undocumented immigrants are entitled to education in public
primary and secondary schools. Plyler's decision hinged on a key
factor: minor children whose parents bring them to the United
States illegally did not make the choice to do so themselves." The
Supreme Court of the United States held that these children are
not comparably situated to those who actively elect to enter the
country unlawfully.'
Although the Court acknowledged that
unlawful entry into the United States is a crime," the majority
ultimately held that the Equal Protection Clause applies equally
to all persons within the borders of the United States, whether or
not their entry was lawful.' As such, the Court held that the
A.

require that the student have attended high school in the state for a certain period
of time in order to be eligible for tuition benefits. NATL IMMIGR. LAW CTR., supra
note 10, at 2.
40. NAT'L IMMIGR. LAW CTR., supra note 10, at 1.
41. Gonzales, supra note 20 (stating that undocumented high school students
"wake up to a nightmare" upon graduation) (emphasis omitted); see also Grace
Talusan, The Thing Is, I'm Undocumented, Bos. MAG. (July 15, 2012), available at
http://www.bostonmagazine.com/articles/2012/06/dream-act-immigration/
(reporting the indecision and fear undocumented high school students face upon
graduation).
42. See NAT'L IMMIGR. LAW CTR., supra note 10, at 2.
43. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
44. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
45. Id. at 220.
46. Id. at 219-20.
47. Id. at 205 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1325 (2006)).
48. Id. at 215. In making their decision, the Court quoted another case:
The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution is not confined to the
protection of citizens... . [Its] provisions are universal in their application,
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Texas statute which denied enrollment in public schools to
undocumented children, without a showing of a valid state
interest, was unconstitutional.4 9
While the public schools at issue in Plyler were elementary
and secondary schools, not public universities," the issue of equal
protection remains when discussing students' access to higher
education. Justice Brennan's majority opinion in Plyler also
highlighted the likelihood that having a large uneducated class
would perpetuate problems of "unemployment, welfare, and
crime."" As the education level of the general population rises, the
value of high school degrees diminishes." Helping undocumented
students access higher education is a step towards preventing the
development of a high school-educated "subclass," leading to the
same problems the Plyler Court feared." Denying undocumented
students access to higher education in an economy full of collegeeducated workers is, therefore, an equal protection issue under
Plyler.
B.

State Dream Acts Are Economically Sound
Proponents of restrictionist legislation argue that Plyler is
only applicable in situations where no valid state interest is at
stake."
This argument relies on an understanding that
restrictionist legislation is only harmful to undocumented
immigrants. Unfortunately, restrictionist requirements are not
only harmful to the people they target, but also burdensome to
lawfully present immigrants and to society as a whole." Still,

to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any
differences of race, of color, or of nationality; and the protection of the laws
is a pledge of the protection of equal laws.
Id. at 212 (quoting Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886) (emphasis
omitted)).
49. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982).
50. Id. at 206.
51. Id. at 230.
52. See, e.g., Peter T. Kilborn, For High School Graduates,A Job Market of
Dead Ends, N. Y. TIMES, May 30, 1994 at 1, 23.
53. Id.

54. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 230 ("If the State is to deny a discrete group of innocent
children the free public education that it offers to other children residing within its
borders, that denial must be justified by a showing that it furthers some
substantial state interest.").
55. See United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980, 996-97 (D. Ariz. 2010)
(holding that a system of routinely checking immigrants' papers is an unacceptable
burden on those lawfully present in the country); NAT'L IMMIGR. LAW CTR., supra

note 10, at 2 (describing the positive effect undocumented students can have on the
national economy).
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opponents of state Acts argue that state financial interests should
prevent granting in-state tuition to undocumented students."
Indeed, out-of-state tuition for a four-year college can be close to
double the tuition charged to an in-state student, and federal
financial aid sources are not available to undocumented students."
While states are understandably concerned about protecting
tuition revenue, the number of undocumented students who
actually attend college in states that have passed Dream Acts has
remained low." Undocumented students are also likely to attend
community colleges, which offer open enrollment, as an alternative
to attending public universities." In fact, schools that charge instate tuition to undocumented students are seeing increased
revenue from students who would not otherwise be able to attend
Overall, any negative impact on universities and
college.o
students who are citizens is negligible-but the potential benefits
to states that admit students under state Dream Acts are
enormous. 61
Financial arguments also weigh strongly in favor of allowing
undocumented students to obtain a college education.62 The jobs
available to high school graduates are lower paying than those
available to college graduates, meaning that undocumented
students who successfully complete a bachelor's degree will
generally have more money to spend, and will pay higher taxes.'
Arguments that undocumented immigrants would take jobs away
56. Kris Kobach, Kris Kobach: Repealing Tuition Law isn't 'Mean-Spirited',
WICHITA TIMES, Feb. 22, 2011, http://www.kansas.com/2011/02/22/1730509/kriskobach-repealing-tuition.html; NAT'L IMMIGR. LAW CTR., supra note 10, at 3.
57. NATL IMMIGR. LAW CTR., supra note 10, at 1. For example, George Mason
University charges $9,000 annually for in-state students and $17,000 for out-ofstate or undocumented students. Dina Horwedel & Christina Asquith, For Illegal
College Students, An Uncertain Future, 23 DIVERSE ISSUES IN HIGHER EDUC. 22, 24
(2006).
58. NAT'L IMMIGR. LAW CTR., supra note 10, at 1.
59. NAT'L IMMIGR. LAW CTR., THE DREAM ACT: CORRECTING MYTHS AND
MISCONCEPTIONS (2010), available at http://www.nilc.org/dream-correcting-mythsmisperceptions.html.
60. Id.
61. See id. (remarking that the increased tax base from students who graduate
from state universities will eventually allow more students to attend college).
62. BATALOVA & MCHUGH, supra note 14, at 13.
63. NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT., U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., THE CONDITION OF
EDUCATION, MEDIAN ANNUAL EARNINGS AND PERCENTAGE OF FULL-TIME, FULLWAGE AND SALARY WORKERS AGES 25-35, BY EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT, SEX, AND
RACE/ETHNICITY (2012), available at http://nces.ed.gov/programs/coe/tables/tableer2-1.asp (reporting the median annual earnings of workers from ages 25 to 34,
separated by education, sex, and race); see also Miranda, supra note 33, at 1
(outlining the CBO's estimation that the DREAM Act will cut deficits and increase
revenues).
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from U.S. citizens also fall flat." Currently, most children of
undocumented immigrants find themselves forced to take illegal
jobs in the cash economy." This is in itself an economic burden on
states, which have already invested money into K-12 education for
undocumented students." It makes little sense to prevent these
students from using their education. State Dream Acts would
allow driven, talented members of society to join the American
workforce by achieving the education necessary for high-skilled
jobs -a step essential to qualifying for the federal DREAM Act
when it is passed."
State DreamActs Are Sufficiently Limited in Scope
Opponents of state Acts also argue that allowing in-state
tuition encourages immigrants to come to the United States
illegally." Both state and federal Dream Acts are portrayed as
rewarding those who broke the law and encouraging those who
have broken the law to continue living under the radar in the
United States.7 o This argument is an oversimplification of the
issue. Not only has the Supreme Court held that undocumented
children cannot be held responsible for their parents' wrongdoing,
but United States immigration policy also has a long history of
recognizing the importance of ties immigrants develop with the
United States itself." State Dream Acts are in no way amnesty, as
their scope is limited to tuition benefits. 72 Even in states that have
C.

64. Miranda, supra note 33, at 3.
65. NAT'L IMMIGR. LAW CTR., THE ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF THE DREAM ACT
at
available
(2005),
ACT
ADJUSTMENT
THE
STUDENT
AND
http://www.nilc.orglecon bensdream&stdntadjst_0205.html [hereinafter NILC
Report].
66. OJEDA ET AL., supra note 8, at 3.
67. See Miranda, supra note 33, at 1. Because those eligible for the federal Act
are hardworking, talented people, military recruiters have proved to be strong
supporters of its passage. Id. The Act is now incorporated into the Department of
Defense's recruiting plan. Id.
68. NAT'L IMMIGR. LAW CTR., supra note 65; see also Stein, supra note 32
(supporting giving opportunities to talented students through Dream Acts).
69. See, e.g., Mark Krikorian, Why Jose Antonio Vargas Should Leave the U.S.,
NAT'L PUB. RADIO (July 7, 2011), http://www.npr.org/2011/07/07/ 137653256/whyjose-antonio-vargas-should-leave-the-u-s (arguing that Dream Acts encourage
illegal immigration and calling Dream Acts a form of amnesty).
70. Id.
71. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 228 (1982); Shah, supra note 3, at 653-54
(describing the history of legal recognition of ties immigrants form with the United
States).
72. See, e.g., TEX. HIGHER EDUC. COORD. BD., RESIDENCY AND IN-STATE TUITION
www.sos.state.tx.us/border/forms/reports-07/theebavailable at
(2007),
1
april2007.pdf.
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passed Dream Acts, those who commit criminal acts or are
otherwise a burden to society are still subject to deportation."
Immigration to the United States also has a positive correlation
with the availability of jobs-in other words, the prospect of
employment, rather than a desire for citizenship, is most likely the
strongest motivator for immigration to the United States." State
Dream Acts are, therefore, only a way to help talented students
excel academically, and eventually find higher-paying jobs for
which they would not otherwise be eligible. 5
II. State Power to Delegate Immigration
The doctrine of federalism gives states the freedom to
experiment and learn from each other's mistakes.7 ' Based upon
the Tenth Amendment," this doctrine allows national sentiment to
develop through state legislation, often resulting in a change in
federal policy.78 In the often-contentious debate over immigration
policy, state Dream Acts may ultimately be of utmost importance
in developing federal policy. To be effective, however, the Acts
must not exceed the limits of state power.7 ' As such, two major
concerns must be kept in mind by state legislators: the federal

73. Miranda, supra note 33, at 2-3; Memorandum from John Morton, Dir. of
U.S. Customs and Immigration Enforcement, to All Field Office Directors, All
Special Agents in Charge, and All Chief Counsel 3-6 (June 17, 2011); see also
BATALOVA & MCHUGH, supra note 14, at 1-2 (remarking that the federal DREAM
Act does not provide amnesty, but rather allows certain undocumented immigrants
to apply for a conditional permanent residency status).
74. Julia Preston, Mexican Data Show Migration to U.S. in Decline, N.Y. TIMES,
at
available
Al,
at
15,
2009,
May
("Mexican
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/15/us/15immig.html?pagewanted=all
and American researchers say that the current decline [in migration to the United
States] . . . is largely a result of Mexicans' deciding to delay illegal crossings
because of the lack of jobs in the ailing American economy.").
75. See Gonzales, supra note 20.
76. See, e.g., Clare Huntington, The Constitutional Dimension of Immigration
Federalism, 61 VAND. L. REV. 787, 832 (2008) (noting that states which have
required high levels of documentation from migrant workers have quickly found
that this detrimentally reduces the available labor force).
77. U.S. CONST. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people.").
78. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII (establishing Prohibition in the United
States); U.S. CONST. amend. XXI (repealing Prohibition). Both amendments were
passed in response to national sentiment. See Kris W. Kobach, May "We the
People" Speak?: The Forgotten Role of Constituent Instructions in Amending the
Constitution, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 80-88 (1999) (explaining the role of state
actions in repealing Prohibition).
79. See De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 354-56 (1976).
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plenary power to regulate immigration, and federal laws which
could preempt state legislation.0
A. The FederalPlenary Power to Regulate Immigration
The federal government's power to regulate immigration
stems from Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution."' However, the
language of the Constitution is silent as to whether states may
also regulate immigration; it is neither expressly authorized nor
expressly barred." As such, the federal plenary power over
immigration is largely based in court precedent." Beginning in
the late nineteenth century, the United States Supreme Court
rejected state and local measures attempting to regulate
immigration." Specifically, the Court held that states did not have
the power to enforce immigration laws through criminal
sanctions."
Even so, states and localities do have the right to impose
some regulations on undocumented immigrants within their
borders."
Through the 1996 passage of § 287(g) of the
80. See Debra Urteaga, California Dreaming: A Case to Give States Discretion
in Providing In-State Tuition to Its Undocumented Students, 38 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 721, 731*37 (2011) (analyzing whether the California Dream Act is
preempted).
81. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4, 18 ("The Congress shall have Power ... To
establish a uniform Rule of Naturalization. . . [and] To make all Laws which shall
be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers . . . .").
82. See Huntington, supra note 86, at 812-13 (arguing that the Constitution's
silence on the regulation of immigration is due to the debate over slavery at the
time of its writing).
83. FEERE, supra note 22, at 1-2 (describing powers courts have asserted in
immigration law).
84. See Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 280 (1875). The Supreme Court
first struck down a state immigration regulation in 1875, citing foreign policy
concerns:
The passage of laws which concern the admission of citizens and subjects
of foreign nations to our shores belongs to Congress, and not to the States.
It has the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations: the
responsibility for the character of those regulations, and for the manner of
their execution, belongs solely to the national government. If it be
otherwise, a single State can, at her pleasure, embroil us in disastrous
quarrels with other nations.
Id. For a more detailed history of immigration federalism in the late nineteenth
century, see Juliet P. Stumpf, States of Confusion: The Rise of State and Local
Power Over Immigration,86 N.C. L. REV. 1557, 1566-74 (2008).
85. Stumpf, supra note 84, at 1574; see also Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356,
369 (1886) (holding that criminal sanctions could not be applied differently to
immigrants than to natural citizens); Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228,
238 (1896) (ruling that constitutional protections applied to immigrants in criminal
cases); Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U.S. 585 (1913) (holding that only the federal
government has the power of deportation).
86. Huntington, supranote 76, at 800-05.
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87

Immigration and Nationality Act,
state and local law
enforcement were given the power to enforce federal immigration
laws.' This power is limited only to state actions which do not
interfere with federal regulatory interests; for example, states
cannot stop and detain a person "solely on suspicion of
deportability."" Still, through the delegation of the power of
enforcement, some federal authority was thereby granted to the
The federal government's plenary power over
states.9o
immigration is therefore not absolute."
B.

FederalPower to Preempt State Immigration Law Is
Based Upon De Canas v. Bica

The federal plenary power to regulate immigration is also
supported by the Supremacy Clause, which dictates that federal
law will preempt conflicting state law.9 2 Especially in foreign
affairs, where laws enacted in one state could endanger the nation
as a whole, preemption is a concern that state lawmakers must
As immigration and foreign policy are intimately
consider."
related, state Dream Acts can only be constitutional if they do not
encroach upon federal power.9 4
87. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (2006).
88. Id. The statute reads in part:
[T]he Attorney General may enter into a written agreement with a State..
. pursuant to which an officer or employee of the State or subdivision, who
is determined by the Attorney General to be qualified to perform a
function of an immigration officer . .. may carry out such function at the
expense of the State or political subdivision and to the extent consistent
with State and local law.
Id.

See also Marissa B. Litwin, The Decentralization of Immigration Law: The

Mischief of § 287(g), 41 SETON HALL L. REV. 399, 409-10 (2011) (criticizing the
statute for leading to unconstitutional racial profiling and other breaches of
constitutional law).
89. April McKenzie, A Nation of Immigrants or a Nation of Suspects? State and
Local Enforcement of Federal Immigration Laws Since 9/11, 55 ALA. L. REV. 1149,

1152 (2004) (describing law enforcement powers under 287(g)).
90. See Litwin, supra note 88, at 409 ("By delegating immigrant detention to
local authorities, the federal government again decentralized immigration
control.").
91. Id.

92. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof .. . shall be the supreme Law of
the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.").
93. Huntington, supra note 86, at 816; see also Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S.
52, 62-63 (1941) ("When the national government .

.

. has established rules and

regulations touching the rights, privileges, obligations or burdens of aliens as such,
the treaty or statute is the supreme law of the land. No state can add to or take
from the force and effect of such treaty or statute. . . .").
94. See Hines, 312 U.S. at 64 ("One of the most important and delicate of all
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Not all state statutes related to immigration status are
subject to preemption, however. In De Canas v. Bica, the United
States Supreme Court held that "the fact that aliens are the
subject of a state statute does not render it .a regulation of
immigration."" The Court listed three situations where a state
statute would be preempted by federal law: "1) where the local
law attempts to regulate immigration; 2) where the local law
attempts to operate in an area occupied by federal law; and 3)
where implementation of the local law is an obstacle or 'burdens or
conflicts in any manner with any federal laws or treaties."'" By
naming three distinct categories, the De Canas Court broadened
the reach of the doctrine of preemption. The first category is often
referred to as facial regulation of immigration; the latter two
categories have been named field and conflict preemption,
respectively."
III. Restrictionist Legislation in Courts
This Section discusses court analysis of restrictionist
legislation passed by Arizona and Alabama." Both pieces of
legislation were written as lists of provisions to be incorporated
Because each bill also included a
into each state's code.9"
severability provision, courts were able to examine each provision
separately, and invalidation of any one provision did not invalidate
the bill as a whole. 00
A.

Arizona: S.B. 1070 Analyzed Under De Canas
In 2010, the Arizona Senate enacted the Support Our Law

international relationships, recognized immemorially as a responsibility of
government, has to do with the protection of the just rights of a country's own
nationals when those nationals are in another country.").
95. De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 355 (1976).
96. Garrett v. City of Escondido, 465 F. Supp. 2d 1043, 1055 (S.D. Cal. 2006)
(summarizing the factors outlined in De Canas).
97. Id. When a statutory scheme created by Congress is so "pervasive" that the
intent was that states would not be able to "supplement it," state regulation is
subject to field preemption. When it is "impossible" to comply with both state and
federal regulations, or when state law interferes with Congressional objectives, the
state regulation is subject to conflict preemption, United States v. Vasquez-Alvarez,
176 F.3d 1294, 1297 n.3 (10th Cir. 1999); McKenzie, supra note 89, at 1151-52
(discussing federal preemption of state immigration statutes).
98. See S.B. 1070, supra note 23; Beason-Hammon Alabama Taxpayer and
Citizen Protection Act, Act No. 2011-535, Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2011), available at
http://www.ncsl.org/documents/statefed/AlabamaH56.pdf [hereinafter H.B. 56].
99. S.B. 1070, supra note 23; H.B. 56, supra note 98.
100. S.B. 1070, supra note 23, at § 12(a); United States v. Alabama, 813 F. Supp.
2d. 1282, 1292 (N.D. Ala. 2011).
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Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act (S.B. 1070).'
Shortly
thereafter, the United States filed a complaint in United States
District Court of Arizona to enjoin the bill."o2 The district court did
enjoin key parts of S.B. 1070, including provisions which: 1)
required officers to determine a person's immigration status of any
person stopped, detained, or arrested; 2) created a crime for the
failure to apply for or carry registration papers; 3) created a crime
for an undocumented immigrant to solicit, apply for, or perform
work; and 4) authorized the warrantless arrest of a person when
there is probable cause they could be deported."
Of these
provisions, only the provision requiring officers to determine a
person's immigration status was upheld by the United States
Supreme Court."' Other sections of the bill were not enjoined, as
S.B. 1070 contained a severability clause.'
Notably, both the district court and the Supreme Court cited
concerns with burdening lawful United States residents, as well as
the burdens on federal resources this type of state law can
require."' Ultimately, however, both courts were most concerned
with preemption by federal statutes."' As stated by the district
court, "[e]ven though Arizona's interests may be consistent with
those of the federal government, it is not in the public interest for
Arizona to enforce preempted laws."" Since three of the four
provisions at issue were struck down by the Supreme Court, other
states with similar restrictionist statutes may need to reexamine
whether these statutes are preempted by federal law.
B.

Alabama: H.B. 56 Analyzed Under Wyeth
Much like Arizona's S.B. 1070, Alabama's Beason-Hammon
Alabama Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act (H.B. 56)," was
101. S.B. 1070, supra note 23.
102. United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980, 986 (D. Ariz. 2010).
103. Id. at 987.
104. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012) (upholding the provision on
the grounds that federal and state officials are encouraged to communicate with
one another, and refusing to consider constitutional challenges to the provision
because the law was not yet in effect).
105. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d at 993. Only the four provisions named above
were considered by the Supreme Court. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492
(2012).
106. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d at 996.
107. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2500 (2012) ("The issue is
whether, under preemption principles, federal law permits Arizona to implement
the state-law provisions in dispute.").
108. United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980, 1008 (D. Ariz. 2010).
109. H.B. 56, supra note 98.
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challenged by the United States as being preempted by federal
law." The district court granted motions for injunctions to certain
sections of H.B. 56, but denied injunctions for other sections."'
H.B. 56 included sections similar to Arizona's S.B. 1070, as well as
provisions which made it unlawful to conceal, harbor, or transport
an undocumented immigrant; barred employers from hiring
undocumented immigrants if United States citizens had applied;
and prevented undocumented immigrants from entering into
contracts or business transactions."'
The district court chose to enjoin some selected provisions of
this bill, but did not enjoin others, including a section which
required police officers to determine a person's status upon a stop
or arrest."' On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
upheld the majority of the district court's ruling, but enjoined two
additional provisions, sections 10 and 28.n1 Section 10 of H.B. 56
would have created a misdemeanor crime for immigrants to be
undocumented;"' section 28 of H.B. 56 would have required
elementary and secondary schools to determine students'
immigration status upon enrollment."6 The Eleventh Circuit
enjoined each of these provisions."'
Although United States v. Alabama is an important marker
in the debate over state immigration legislation, the Eleventh
Circuit's analysis is not entirely on point. Notably, only the
district court produced any preemption analysis."' The opinion
issued by the court of appeals only referenced the requirements for
granting an injunction, without providing any analysis of
preemption."9 The district court's preemption analysis was based
on the Supreme Court case of Wyeth v. Levine."0 Wyeth does
discuss the issue of preemption by federal law, but unlike De
110. United States v. Alabama (Alabama1), 813 F. Supp. 2d 1282 (D. Ala. 2011).
111. United States v. Alabama, 443 F. App'x 411 (11th Cir. 2011).
112. Alabama 1, 813 F. Supp. 2d at 1292-93.
113. Id. at 1342-44.
114. United States v. Alabama, 443 F. App'x at 420.
115. H.B. 56, supra note 98, at § 10.
116. Id. at § 28.
117. United States v. Alabama, 443 F. App'x at 420.
118. United States v. Alabama (Alabama 1), 813 F. Supp. 2d 1282, 1299-301 (D.
Ala. 2011).
119. United States v. Alabama, 443 F. App'x 411 (11th Cir. 2011). To date,
certiorari has not been filed with the United States Supreme Court.
120. Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (2009). Wyeth sets a precedent of two
"cornerstones" of preemption analysis: first, the purpose of Congress in enacting
federal regulations must be analyzed, and second, that a presumption against
preemption applies in any field which States have traditionally regulated. Id. at
565-66.
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Canas, the statute at issue in Wyeth was not an immigration
regulation.12 ' As such, De Canas and the three categories of
preempted statutes it outlines provide more guidance to courts
faced with state immigration statutes.
Other Challenges to RestrictionistLegislation
The statutes challenged in Alabama and Arizona are far from
the only examples of their kind, and challenges to such laws are
continually being brought. On October 31, 2011, a complaint was
filed by the United States against the state of South Carolina
challenging a state law, Act 69.122 The Act would, among other
things, mandate status determinations, prohibit undocumented
immigrants from working, and create an "Illegal Immigration
Enforcement Unit."' 2 The Act was expected to become effective in
January 2012; however, a preliminary injunction against the law
was issued by the district court shortly before the law went into
The court enjoined provisions similar to those in S.B.
effect.'
1070, and highlighted three major concerns about restrictionist
legislation held by the federal government: federal ability to
control foreign relations, the occupation of the field of immigration
enforcement by the federal government, and the need for
immigration control to be within the discretion and control of the
federal government under the Immigration and Nationality Act.'2
In issuing the injunction, the court found that the United States
would likely suffer irreparable harm should Act 69 be enforced.126
C.

121. Id. The issue in Wyeth was whether the Food and Drug Administration's
labeling judgments preempted state law product liability claims. Id. at 563-64.
122. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, at 1, United States v.
South Carolina 840 F. Supp. 2d 898 (D.S.C. 2011), available at
www.justice.gov/opaldocuments/us-v-se-complaint.pdf.
See also Press Release,
Dep't of Justice, Department of Justice Challenges South Carolina's Immigration
Law (Oct. 31, 2011), available at http://wwwjustice.gov/opa/pr/2011/October/11-ag1429.html.
123. S. 20, 2011 Gen. Assemb., 119th Sess. (S.C. 2011) §§ 6, 10, 16, available at
http://www.scstatehouse.gov/sessll9_2011-2012/bills/20.htm.
124. Press Release, Dep't of Justice, supra note 122; South Carolina, 840 F.
Supp. 2d 898.
125. South Carolina,840 F. Supp. 2d at 916-17, 918, 921-22; see also Complaint
for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 122, at 16 (outlining the federal
government's arguments against Act 69).
126. South Carolina,840 F. Supp. 2d at 924-27. The only provision of Act 69
which the court did not enjoin was section 15, which prohibits making or selling
counterfeit I.D.s for undocumented immigrants. Id. at 927. For a more detailed
analysis of the South Carolina decision, see Patrick J. Charles,Recentering Foreign
Affairs Preemptionin Arizona v. United States: FederalPlenary Power, the Spheres
of Government, and the Constitutionality of S.B. 1070, 60 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 133,

135-36 (2012).
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These three concerns translate directly to the guidelines
outlined in the Supreme Court case of De Canas v. Bica." First, a
regulation of immigration which conflicts with federal law, or
attempts to regulate the same field, is unconstitutional. 2 8 The De
Canas Court stated that a regulation of immigration "is essentially
a determination of who should or should not be admitted into the
country, and the conditions under which a legal entrant may
remain.""' Second, preemption under De Canas applies not only to
statutes that facially regulate immigration, but also to those which
attempt to operate in an area occupied by federal law (field
preemption)."' Finally, statutes whose implementation burdens or
conflicts with federal law are preempted (conflict preemption).
Like restrictionist legislation, state Dream Acts regulate
immigration. In order to withstand scrutiny in courts, state Acts
must not occupy the same field as federal law and must not be
either field or conflict preempted.
IV. State Dream Acts Are Fundamentally Constitutional
Although state Dream Acts are a type of immigration policy,
they are of a drastically different nature than state restrictionist
While restrictionist legislation accomplishes its
legislation.
purpose by imposing regulations on undocumented immigrants
(and, often, the general population as well), state Dream Acts are
often little more than a redefinition of the term "resident."13 '
Restrictionist legislation operates mainly in the criminal sphere,
whereas Dream Acts provide opportunities that undocumented
Despite this
immigrants would not otherwise be afforded.'13
fundamental difference, the three-part structure of De Canas v.
Bica applies equally to both types of legislation."' And, unlike
restrictionist legislation, state Dream Acts are constitutional
under this three-part analysis.'

127. De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 355 (1976).
128. Id. at 357 n.5.
129. Id. at 355.
130. Id. at 356.
131. Id. at 357 n.5.
132. See, e.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE § 68130.5 (Deering 2011).
133. Compare S.B. 1070, supra note 23, at § 5(c) (exemplifying restrictionist
legislation), with CAL. EDUC. CODE § 68130.5 (Deering 2011) (epitomizing many
state Dream Acts).
134. See Urteaga, supra note 80, at 735-46 (applying the De Canas test in a
preemption analysis of the California Dream Act).
135. Id. at 745-46.
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RestrictionistLegislation Preempted by FederalLaw
Federal statutes and regulations come into play in an
The first is the
analysis of state restrictionist statutes.
Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA), which regulates
employment by sanctioning employers who hire undocumented
immigrants."6 Regulations passed by government authorities,
such as the Attorney General or the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS), may also preempt state
As such, state restrictionist legislation is
regulations."'
particularly likely to either directly conflict with federal law, or be
subject to field or conflict preemption."'
A.

1. Failure to Carry Documentation: A Regulation of
Immigration
In Arizona v. United States, the Supreme Court analyzed
section 3 of S.B. 1070, which created a misdemeanor crime for
failure to complete or carry an alien registration document.'"9 The
statute imposed penalties of a $100 fine and up to twenty days in
jail for a first offense."" Relying upon Hines v. Davidowitz, the
Court held that federal regulation of alien registration was
sufficiently comprehensive that "the Federal Government has
Under Hines, states
occupied the field of alien registration."'
cannot enforce additional measures to such a comprehensive
Although S.B. 1070 did not attempt to change
federal scheme.
the federal requirements for alien registration, the Court held that
"the complete scheme of registration precludes states from
* 136. 8 U.S.C. § 1324 (2006); see also League of United Latin Am. Citizens v.
Wilson (LULAC), 908 F. Supp. 755, 775 (C.D. Cal. 1995) ("Congress has fully
occupied the field of immigration regulation through enactment and
implementation of the INA."); State v. Lopez, 948 So. 2d 1121 (4th Cir. 2006)
(Louisiana statute imposed harsher penalties for driving without identification
than were contemplated by the federal REAL ID Act, Pub.L. No. 109-13).
137. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1421 (2006) (vesting sole naturalization authority in the
United States Attorney General); 8 U.S.C. § 1551-74 (2006) (establishing the INS
and listing its powers and responsibilities); 8 USC § 1601(6) (2006) ("It is a
compelling government interest to remove the incentive for illegal immigration
provided by the availability of public benefits.").
138. See, e.g., Brief for United States, supranote 122.
139. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2501-03 (2012).
140. ARIz. REV. STAT. § 13-1509 (LexisNexis 2012).
141. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. at 2502; see also United States v.
Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980, 999 (D. Ariz. 2010) (holding that federal immigration
regulations created "an integrated and comprehensive system of registration.").
142. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 66-67 (1941) ("[Wlhere the federal
government .

.

. has enacted a complete scheme of regulation .

.

. states cannot,

inconsistently with the purpose of Congress, conflict or interfere with, curtail or
complement, the federal law, or enforce additional or auxiliary regulations.").
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conflicting with or complementing the federal law.""
A similar provision in Alabama's H.B. 56 was challenged in
United States v. Alabama.'" Unlike the Arizona court, the district
court in Alabama chose not to enjoin section 10 of H.B. 56, finding
no Congressional intent to preempt state law on the subject.14 5 The
Alabama district court held that the state could enforce section 10,
finding that the statute did not affect "the uniformity of the
national standard for alien registration."" On appeal, however,
this provision was enjoined after minimal discussion.147 The
appellate court did, however, note that there was a substantial
likelihood of irreparable harm to those affected by section 10.'"
Considering the Arizona court's description of the substantial
harms caused by such registration requirements, Alabama's
reversal is unsurprising.'4 The registration requirements are a
facial regulation of immigration, falling under the first prong of
the De Canas test, and are therefore, preempted by federal law.'
2. Status Determinations: An Example of Conflict
Preemption
Provisions in S.B. 1070 which required police officers to
determine a person's immigration status at any lawful stop,
detention, or arrest were initially enjoined by the district court in
United States v. Arizona."' S.B. 1070 required that "[a]ny person
who is arrested shall have the person's immigration status
The district court
determined before the person is released."'
rejected an interpretation of this sentence that only required
status determinations where a reasonable suspicion exists."
Because this provision would be generally applicable in any arrest
situation, the court found this requirement would be unduly
143. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d at 999 (citing Hines, 312 U.S. at 66-67).
144. United States v. Alabama (Alabama1), 813 F. Supp. 2d 1282 (D. Ala. 2011).
145. Id. at 1306 ("The United States has not directed this court to any authority
for the proposition that Congress intended exclusivity, rather than uniformity.").
146. Id. at 1307.
147. United States v. Alabama (Alabama II) 443 F.App'x. 411, 420 (11th Cir.
2011) (reversing the decision of the district court with regard to section 10 of H.B.
56).
148. Id. at 419-20.
149. United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980, 999 (noting that section 3 of
S.B. 1070 would lead to more state prosecutions for federal crimes, and would
thereby alter penalties set by Congress).
150. Id. at 982.
151. Id.
152. ARiz. REV. STAT. § 11-1051 (Lexis Nexis 2012).
153. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d at 994.
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burdensome on federal resources, and would "impermissibly shift
the allocation of federal resources away from federal priorities.""
Overall, the district court found that S.B. 1070 was preempted by
federal law for two key reasons: the impermissible burden placed
upon those lawfully present in the United States, and the "burden
on federal resources and priorities.""'
Despite the district court's ruling that section 2(B) of S.B.
1070 was preempted, the Supreme Court chose not to enjoin this
provision."' Instead of focusing on burdens such legislation would
place on federal resources, the Court construed the statute to
prevent any potential conflict."' While unconstitutionally lengthy
detentions would likely present a conflict with federal law, the
Court could not determine whether such detentions would take
place once the law went into effect."' Likewise, the Court noted
that Congress encouraged cooperation between state and federal
The Court did acknowledge that
authorities, as 2(B) requires.'
section 2(B) could be preempted with a showing that the law "has
other consequences that are adverse to federal law and its
objectives."'' However, by making this note, the Court left the
door open for a later ruling that even though it may not be
preempted in theory, in practice, section 2(B) conflicts with
constitutional or other federal law.
3. Criminalization of Seeking Employment: Field
Preemption by Inaction
Both Arizona's S.B. 1070 and Alabama's H.B. 56 made it a
misdemeanor offense for undocumented immigrants to work or
apply for jobs.'"' Section 5(c) of Arizona's S.B. 1070 provided that
"it is unlawful for a person who is unlawfully present in the
United States and who is an unauthorized alien to knowingly
apply for work, solicit work in a public place or perform work as an
employee or independent contractor in this state."'" The language

154. Id. at 995.
155. Id. at 998.
156. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2507-10 (2012).

157. Id. at 2516 ("[W]ithout the benefit of a definitive interpretation from the
state courts, it would be inappropriate to assume § 2(B) will be construed in a way
that creates a conflict with federal law.").
158. Id.

159.
160.
161.
162.

Id. at 2509.
Id.
S.B. 1070, supra note 23, at § 5(c); H.B. 56, supra note 98, at § 11(a).
S.B. 1070, supra note 23, at § 5(c).
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of section 11(a) of H.B. 56 was practically identical."*
The Arizona Court, analyzing S.B. 1070 §5(c), found that this
provision was preempted because Congress had regulated the field
of employment for undocumented workers to its satisfaction.'" In
particular, both the district court and the Supreme Court noted
that the legislative history of IRCA" indicated a congressional
intent to avoid punishing workers.'66 The district court held that,
if a portion of a comprehensive federal scheme is intentionally left
without regulation, an inference can be drawn that the federal
scheme preempts state action."'
"Congress' inaction in not
criminalizing work, joined with its action of making it illegal to
hire unauthorized workers, justifies a preemptive inference that
Congress intended to prohibit states from criminalizing work."'"
The United States District Court of Alabama, five months later,
quoted and affirmed this language."' Both the Alabama and the
Arizona courts emphasized that they could only make this finding
when there was both action and inaction by Congress; inaction
alone does not create an inference of preemption.'
Notably, the Alabama district court found that section 11(a)
of H.B. 56 was subject to conflict preemption as well as field
preemption."' Whereas the congressional scheme levied sanctions
against employers who violated the law, the Alabama statute

163. H.B. 56, supra note 98, at § 11(a) ("It is unlawful for a person who is an
unauthorized alien to knowingly apply for work, solicit work in a public or private
place, or perform work as an employee or independent contractor in this state.").
164. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2502 (2012).
165. 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a) (2006).
166. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. at 2505 ("The correct instruction to
draw from the text, structure, and history of IRCA is that Congress decided it
would be inappropriate to impose criminal penalties . . . It follows that a state law
to the contrary is an obstacle to the regulatory system Congress chose."); United
States v. Arizona, 641 F.3d 339, 357 n. 17 (2011) (quoting National Center for
Immigrants' Rights, Inc. v. I.N.S., 913 F.2d 1350, 1368 (9th Cir. 1990)) ("during the
hearings which shaped IRCA, the Executive Assistant to the INS Commissioner
stated that the INS did 'not expect the individual to starve in the United States
while he is exhausting both the administrative and judicial roads that the [INA]
gives him."').
167. United States v. Arizona, 641 F.3d at 359 ("Where a comprehensive federal
scheme intentionally leaves a portion of the regulated field without controls, then
the preemptive inference can be drawn-not from federal inaction alone, but from
inaction joined with action.").
168. Id.
169. United States v. Alabama (AlabamaI), 813 F. Supp. 2d 1282, 1316 (D. Ala.
2011).
170. See Puerto Rico Dep't of Consumer Affairs v. Isla Petroleum Corp., 485 U.S.
495, 503 (1988).
171. Alabama 1, 813 F. Supp. 2d at 1335-36.
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penalized the workers themselves."' The district court found this
to be in direct conflict with a deliberate decision by Congress."'
State Acts Are Not Preempted Under De Canas
While state restrictionist legislation is preempted by federal
legislation in several ways, state Dream Acts are not subject to the
same concerns. Applicable federal statutes have been shown not
to preempt Dream Acts under De Canas."' Furthermore, state
Acts are constitutional under the Equal Protection Clause, and are
not harmful to citizens."' State Dream Acts are, all told, very
different in nature from restrictionist legislation.
B.

1. Applicable Federal Statutes
States enacting immigration legislation must be mindful of
two federal statutes. The first, the Personal Responsibility and
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA), was passed in
Under PRWORA, undocumented immigrants are not
1996."7
eligible for state or local public benefits."' However, under
subsection (d), states may affirmatively provide for such
eligibility."' Shortly after PRWORA was signed into law, the
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act
(IIRARA) was passed.' 7 IIRARA provides that undocumented
students cannot be eligible for postsecondary education benefits,
such as in-state tuition, unless United States citizens or nationals
are eligible for the same benefit."' Although state Dream Acts
172. Id. at 1312 ("The text of IRCA reflects a clear choice on the part of Congress
to deter the employment of unauthorized aliens through a detailed scheme of civil
and criminal sanctions against employers, not employees.").
173. Id. at 1312-13.
174. See, e.g., Martinez v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 241 P.3d 855 (Cal. 2010).
175. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 217 (1982); Day v. Bond, 500 F.3d 1127,
1133 (10th Cir. 2007).
176. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1621 (2006).
177. Id.
178. Id.
A State may provide that an alien who is not lawfully present in the
United States is eligible for any State or local public benefit for which such
alien would otherwise be ineligible under subsection (a) of this section only
through the enactment of a State law after August 22, 1996, which
affirmatively provides for such eligibility.
Id.
179. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, 8 U.S.C. §
1623 (2006).
180. Id.
[A]n alien who is not lawfully present in the United States shall not be
eligible on the basis of residence within a State . . . for any postsecondary
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have been challenged under this language, these claims have not
been successful." In-state tuition benefits are calculated to credit
residents of a state for their daily contributions to the local
economy. 8 2 Out-of-state students, unlike undocumented in-state
students, are not contributing to the economy, and therefore,
whether they are eligible for in-state tuition is not relevant to the
purpose of the benefit."
Court decisions have not been consistent as to whether
PRWORA and IIRARA in combination preempt state restrictionist
legislation.'" For example, the court in League of United Latin
American Citizens v. Wilson held that a state statute that barred
undocumented immigrants from receiving social services, health
care, and education was preempted by PRWORA." By contrast,
Equal Access Education v. Merten found that a state policy barring
undocumented students from admission to public universities was
not preempted by either PRWORA or IIRARA. "

One especially promising recent development for state Dream
Acts is California's success in upholding their Act.'" California's
educational code provides for in-state tuition eligibility for any
undocumented student who attended a California high school for
more than three years, graduated, and has filed an affidavit
stating their intent to legalize their immigration status." This
statute was upheld by the California Supreme Court in
Martinez,"' and the United States Supreme Court denied
certiorari.' The California Act has thus become a model for other
state Acts.19'
education benefit unless a citizen or national of the United States is
eligible for such a benefit (in no less an amount, duration, and scope)
without regard to whether the citizen or national is such a resident.
Id.
181. See, e.g., Day v. Bond, 500 F.3d 1127, 1139 (10th Cir. 2007) (rejecting out-ofstate students' complaint, and noting that the plaintiffs would not have been
eligible for the in-state tuition benefit even if the undocumented students were also
not eligible).
182. The DREAM Act: CorrectingMyths and Misconceptions,supra note 59.
183. Id.
184. See, e.g., League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson (LULAC), 997 F.
Supp. 1244 (C.D. Cal. 1997); Equal Access Educ. v. Merten, 305 F. Supp. 2d 585 (D.
Va. 2004).
185. 997 F. Supp. at 1255.
186. 305 F. Supp. 2d at 607.
187. Martinez v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 241 P.3d 855 (Cal. 2010).
188. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 68130.5 (Deering 2011).
189. 241 P.3d at 870.
190. Martinez v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 131 S. Ct. 2961 (2011).
191. Kasarda, supra note 22, at 226.
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2. Language of State Dream Acts: Use of the Term
"Resident"
To date, state Dream Acts have closely followed two models:
the California model and the Texas model.'" The California
Dream Act is of particular interest, having successfully withstood
a court challenge in Martinez.' Both Acts base eligibility for instate tuition upon time spent attending a state high school,
although there are subtle differences between the two.
New York's Dream Act is one which mirrors the California
Act.'94 The statute provides that undocumented immigrants are
eligible for in-state tuition provided they attended high school in
New York, and have filed an affidavit of intent to legalize their
immigration status.'" The New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Utah
As such, the
Dream Acts also have similar requirements."
Martinez decision is instructive. California's Supreme Court
focused upon the language of IIRARA which denies postsecondary
benefits to immigrants based on residency within a state.97 The
court found that the California Act was not based upon a residency
requirement for two reasons: first, because the language of the
California Act did not apply uniformly to all undocumented
immigrants, and second, because attending a high school for three
years does not in and of itself constitute residency.
The Texas Dream Act differs substantially from the
California Act. Texas Education Code § 54.052 provides "resident
status" to any person who maintained a domicile in Texas for one
year preceding enrollment in an institution of higher education."
California's Act requires three years of high school attendance, not
simply establishment of a domicile."9 Texas also does not require
a student to file an affidavit of intent to legalize their immigration
status.20' However, the Texas Act does meet the requirements
listed in Martinez: only those undocumented immigrants who
192. Id. at 226.
193. Martinez, 241 P.3d at 855. Because California's Supreme Court recently
struck down a challenge to that state's Dream Act, there has been much written on
the subject of California's legislation. See, e.g., Urteaga, supra note 80, at 722
(concluding that California's Dream Act is not preempted by federal law).
194. N.Y. EDUC. LAw § 6206 (7)(a-1) (McKinney 2011).
195. Id.
196. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 21-1-4.6 (2008); OKLA. STAT. tit. 70, § 3242 (2008);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 53B-8-106 (LexisNexis 2009).
197. Martinez v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 241 P.3d 855, 859 (Cal. 2010).
198. Id. at 860.
199. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 54.052 (West 2011).
200. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 68130.5 (Deering 2011).
201. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 54.052 (West 2011).
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have attended school for a year are eligible, and neither domicile
nor attending a school constitute residency." Under Martinez,
therefore, the Texas Act is not preempted by federal law.
The largest difference between the California and the Texas
Acts is in the description of the tuition charged. Where Texas
describes resident status as a positive characteristic making a
person eligible for reduced tuition, California negatively implies
the same through the phrase "exempt from paying nonresident
tuition."203 The California Act does not use the word "resident.""
Several other states have adopted eligibility requirements for instate tuition similar to the Texas Act, including Illinois, Nebraska,
and Washington.205 Each of these state Dream Acts refers to the
term "resident" in some manner.2
3. State Dream Acts Are Not Preempted Under De Canas
Analysis of state Dream Acts under the three-part De Canas
test shows that they are not preempted by federal law. First, state
Acts are not facial regulation of immigration, and are therefore not
directly preempted by federal law.o7 States are free to create their
own residency requirements, and determining who is eligible for
certain tuition rates at state-funded universities is a state
matter.20 s Nor are state acts subject to field preemption. Congress
has not yet occupied the field of tuition rates for undocumented
immigrants. If anything, congressional inaction on the federal
DREAM Act demonstrates that the field of tuition rates is being
purposefully left to the states.209 The combination of the creation
of the Department of Education and subsequent inaction on state
tuition rates surely meets the standards outlined in Isla.21 o
202. Id.
203. Id.; CAL. EDUC. CODE § 68130.5 (Deering 2011).
204. EDUC. § 68130.5.
205. 110 ILL. COMP. STAT. 305 / 7e-5(a) (2009); NEB. REV. STAT. § 85-502(8)(a)
(2008); WASH. REV. CODE § 28B.15.012 (2008).
206. 305 / 7e-5(a) (stating that anyone who meets the requirements is "an Illinois
resident"); § 85-502 (using the phrase "residence requirements"); § 28B.15.012
(using the phrase "resident students").
207. See Urteaga, supra note 80, at 746.
208. See Martinez v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 241 P.3d 855, 862 (Cal. 2010).
209. See Puerto Rico Dep't of Consumer Affairs v. Isla Petroleum Corp., 485 U.S.
495, 503 (1988).
210. Id. ("Where a comprehensive federal scheme intentionally leaves a portion
of the regulated field without controls, then the pre-emptive inference can be
drawn-not from federal inaction alone, but from inaction joined with action."); see
also U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC. OFFICE OF ELEMENTARY & SECONDARY EDUC.,
available at
(2010),
GUIDANCE,
AND
REGULATIONS,
LEGISLATION,
of
Department
(listing
http://ed.gov/about/offices/listloese/legislation.html
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The only remaining issue under De Canas, then, is conflict
preemption."' One potential pitfall inherent in Texas's Dream Act
is that the Act centers upon determination of resident status for
purposes of the education code."' While "resident status" is not
based solely upon whether the person lives in Texas, such
language may conflict with the IIRARA.2' The fact that the issue
of conflict preemption has not yet been raised in courts may
indicate that this is an unduly narrow interpretation of the
IIRARA. Still, the negative language used by California's Act
entails much less risk."' As demonstrated by the Martinez
decision, modeling the language of a state Act after California's
may be an advisable step for states who wish to enact their own
Dream Act."'
C.

Equal ProtectionSupports GrantingIn-State Tuition to
Undocumented Students
Not only are state Acts not preempted by federal law, but
they can be distinguished from restrictionist legislation because
they serve an important constitutional purpose. The Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause provides an additional
protection for state Dream Acts that state restrictionist legislation
simply does not have."
While restrictionist legislation has a
tendency to run afoul of equal protection principles by singling out
minority groups for extra burdens,"7 state Dream Acts strive
towards equalizing educational opportunities for students in U.S.
schools." As the Supreme Court held in Plyler v. Doe, "legislation
Education legislation and regulations which Congress has implemented).
211. De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 358 n.6 (1976) (quoting Takahashi v. Fish
& Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410, 419 (1948)) ("State laws which impose
discriminatory burdens upon the entrance or residence of aliens lawfully within the
United States conflict with this constitutionally derived federal power to regulate
immigration, and have accordingly been held invalid.").
212. TEx. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 54.052 (West 2011) (entitled "Determination of
Resident Status").
213. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, 8 U.S.C. §
1623 (2006) ("Notwithstanding any other provision of law, an alien who is not
lawfully present in the United States shall not be eligible on the basis of residence
within a State ... for any postsecondary education benefit.").
214. See Urteaga,supra note 80, at 726.
215. See Martinez v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 241 P.3d 855 (Cal. 2010)
(holding that Act was neither in violation of federal statute, nor was it federally
preempted).
216. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
217. See, e.g., United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980, 997 (D. Ariz. 2011)
(discussing the burden that routine immigration checks place on those lawfully
present in the United States).
218. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 217 (1982) (stating that legislative

20121

REDEFININGAMERICAN

193

directing the onus of a parent's misconduct against his children
does not comport with fundamental conceptions of justice."2 "
Although the Plyler Court recognized that there is no
constitutional right to education,220 the court simultaneously
emphasized the importance of access to education by quoting
Brown v. Board of Education:
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of
state and local governments .. .. It is the very foundation of
good citizenship . ... In these days, it is doubtful that any

child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is
denied the opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity,
where the state has undertaken to provide it is a right which
must be made available to all on equal terms. 2
The Plyler Court's determination that Texas had no valid
state interest in denying education to undocumented students also
emphasized the detrimental effects of denying education to an
entire class of citizens.22 "It is difficult to understand precisely
what the State hopes to achieve by promoting the creation and
perpetuation of a subclass of illiterates within our boundaries,
surely adding to the problems and costs of unemployment, welfare,
and crime."2 11 It is similarly difficult to understand why a state
would pass restrictionist legislation that prevents an entire class
of people from working. As emphasized by the court in United
States v. Arizona, individuals are not expected to starve in the
United States while they are attempting to legalize their status.224
Thus, equal protection both argues against restrictionist
opportunities for
legislation, and supports educational
undocumented immigrants.
State DreamActs Are Not Harmful to Citizens
One Tenth Circuit decision regarding state Dream Acts is
particularly illuminating. In Day v. Bond, out-of-state students at
universities in Kansas sought to overturn the Kansas Dream
D.

classifications which disadvantage certain classes of people are "treated as
presumptively invidious" by courts).
219. Id. at 220.
220. Id. at 223.
221. Id. at 222-23 (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954)).
222. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 230.
223. Id.
224. See United States v. Arizona, 641 F.3d 339, 360 (9th Cir. 2011) (recognizing
that Congress criminalized the employment of undocumented immigrants, not
working while undocumented); see also Alabama 1, 813 F. Supp. 2d at 1335-36.
(observing that the IRCA places sanctions on employers, not employees).
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Act.22 5 The plaintiffs argued that because they were paying higher
tuition rates than undocumented students, the Dream Act violated
the Equal Protection clause.22 6 The claim was defeated by a motion
for summary judgment in district court, and the Tenth Circuit
Because the injury plaintiffs alleged was "too
affirmed.227
conjectural and speculative," they had no standing to bring the
claim."" The plaintiffs in Day v. Bond also argued that the Dream
This claim was also
Act was preempted by IIRARA.'"
unsuccessful; the court found that IIRARA did not provide a cause
of action for private parties.2O
First, it
Day v. Bond illustrates two key principles.
Acts
are not
Dream
that
state
truth
the
simple
demonstrates
23 1
standing
The
plaintiffs'
citizens.
States
to
United
harmful
claims were defeated twice on summary judgment because they
could not show any concrete injury based upon discriminatory
treatment."' Second, Day v. Bond shows the power of IIRARA: if
a state Dream Act is to be challenged, it cannot be challenged by
individual citizens.2 33 Even if some state citizens disagree with the
enactment of a state Dream Act, it is not up to them to challenge
the Act's constitutionality. State Dream Acts are not harmful to
United States citizens, but are extremely important to those they
help. 2 34
V. Recommendations
As stated above, state Dream Acts, unlike state restrictionist
legislation, are not preempted by federal law. 2 35 However, states
which enact Dream Acts must be prepared for potential
Although claims against state Acts have been
litigation.2 36
successful so far, there are several steps legislators can take to
225. Day v. Bond, 500 F.3d 1127 (10th Cir. 2007); see also KAN. STAT. ANN. § 76731(a) (2011).
226. Day, 500 F.3d at 1130.
227. Id. at 1140; see also Day v. Sebelius, 376 F. Supp. 2d 1022 (D. Kan. 2005)
(holding previously that the Day v. Bond plaintiffs did not have standing).
228. Day, 500 F.3d at 1139.
229. Id. at 1135.
230. Id. at 1139.
231. Day v. Bond, 500 F.3d 1127, 1139 (10th Cir. 2007).
232. Id. at 1132.
233. Id. at 1139 (holding that IIRARA's focus is upon institutions, rather than
students, and that as such, individuals do not have a private right of action under
IIRARA).
234. See BATALOVA & MCHUGH, supranote 14, at 17.
235. See supra notes 1764-2145 and accompanying text.
236. See, e.g., Day, 500 F.3d 1127 (challenging the Kansas Act).
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ensure the acts are not struck down in court.2 37
First, and most apparent, any state Dream Act must contain
a severability provision.2
The courts in both Alabama and
Arizona, faced with long lists of provisions in the respective state
statutes, were able to examine each provision separately because
the legislators had provided a severability provision.239 While state
Dream Acts are often relatively simple pieces of legislation,
severability is one way to prevent an Act from being found
unconstitutional as a whole.
States must also be careful to avoid passing Dream Act
legislation that is based upon residency. 24 0 The IIRARA expressly
bars any educational benefit to undocumented students on the
basis of residency.241 Since the court in Martinez found that high
school attendance in a state and graduation from a school in-state
do not constitute residency in and of themselves, using such
requirements is one avenue states can choose in writing Dream
Act legislation.242 Particularly, states writing such legislation may
wish to model the statute after the California Act, rather than the
Texas Act.2 " Where the Texas statute focuses on "determination of
resident status," the California Act uses the language "exempt
from paying nonresident tuition."2 " Even this small difference in
language can be determinative of whether the Act violates the
IIRARA.
The IIRARA also prohibits state Dream Acts from describing
in-state tuition as a postsecondary education benefit.245 Under the
IIRARA, such benefits can only be available to those not lawfully
in the United States as long as the benefits are equally available
to United States citizens and nationals.2 " PRWORA may also be
problematic for state acts who describe in-state tuition as a
benefit, since undocumented immigrants are not eligible for state

237. Id.; Martinez v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 241 P.3d 855, 860 (Cal. 2010).
238. See, e.g., H.B. 56, supra note 98, at § (11)(a) (finding restrictionist
legislation only partially preempted because it contained a severability provision);
S.B. 1070, supra note 23, at § 5(c).
239. United States v. Alabama (Alabama II), 443 F. App'x 411 (11th Cir. 2011);
United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980, 998 (D. Ariz. 2010).
240. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, 8 U.S.C. §
1623 (2006).
241. Id.
242. Martinez v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 241 P.3d 855, 860 (Cal. 2010).
243. See Urteaga, supra note 80.
244. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 68130.5 (Deering 2011).
245. 8 U.S.C.
246. Id.

§

1623.
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or local public benefits under the federal statute.2 4 Although Day
v. Bond held that in-state tuition was equally available to both
citizens and undocumented immigrants because the benefit was
based on residency alone, describing in-state tuition as a benefit
could potentially open the door to unnecessary litigation under
both IIRARA and PRWORA.m
Another avenue towards preventing challenges to state
Dream Acts lies in standing. Day v. Bond is also instructional in
this area, as the court held that preemption analysis can be
prevented if no party will have standing to bring an action against
Where no private parties had been injured, and
the statute.
where the statute itself did not allow for a private right of action,
there was no cause of action.250 Although specifically providing
against a private right of action is not a perfect solution, it is
certainly one means of preventing unnecessary legislation against
Dream Acts.
Conclusion
State Dream Acts are not amnesty."' They are not a reward
for having broken the law, nor are they costly to states.252 The Acts
are, however, recognition of the fact that young children who have
only known the United States are no less American than any other
child their age. 2 ' Dream Acts also have the potential to be
enormously economically beneficial to states.2 " Under the Acts,
these young people-who number in the millions-will have the
chance to contribute economically to the country to which they
belong.'
Unlike restrictionist legislation, DREAM Acts operate
outside the sphere of federal plenary power; their power is not
preempted, but has been left to the states.256
While state Dream Acts are crucial to the economic success of
both young immigrants and the states in which they grew up,
state Acts remain only a stepping stone towards a much more
247. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, 8 U.S.C.
(2006).
248. Day v. Bond, 500 F.3d 1127 (10th Cir. 2007).

§ 1621

249. Id.
250. Id. at 1136; see also KAN. STAT. ANN. § 76-731a (2011) (the underlying
statute).
251. See OJEDA ET AL., supra note 8, at 2.
252. NAT'L IMMIGR. LAW CTR., supra note 10, at 2.
253. See DEFINE AMERICAN, supra note 1.
254. NAT'L IMMIGR. LAW CTR., supra note 10, at 2.
255. OJEDA ET AL., supra note 8.
256. Urteaga, supra note 80.
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important goal: passage of the federal DREAM Act. While the
DREAM Act will not mandate that states provide in-state tuition
to undocumented students, it will repeal the limiting language of
the IIRARA, and restore the ability to determine residency to
individual states. 5 7 Even more importantly, the DREAM Act will
allow for conditional permanent residency for undocumented
students, and eventually, citizenship-two goals state Acts simply
Federal recognition of these students'
cannot achieve.258
achievements in school, and their contributions to society and the
national economy, would be a positive change in immigration
Until the DREAM Act can be passed, however,
reform.259
undocumented students must rely on state Acts to help them
obtain higher education, and give back to the country they call
home.

257. DREAM Act, supra note 5.
258. Id.
259. See BATALOVA & MCHUGH, supra note 14.

